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UNITED STATES v. HAYS
115 S.Ct. 2431 (1995)
United States Supreme Court
FACTS
Following the 1990 census, Louisiana's congressional
representation fell from eight to seven. The Louisiana
State Legislature responded by enacting a redistricting
plan, Act 42 of 1992 ('CAct 42'). The plan increased the
number of majority-minority districts' from one of eight
(District 2) to two of seven (Districts 2 and 4).2 District
2 resembled in shape the majority-minority district
which had previously existed.3 District 4, was a "Zshaped creature that zigzag[ged] through all or part of
twenty-eight parishes and five of Louisiana's largest cities."4 Four plaintiffs brought suit alleging that Act 42
violated the Equal Protection Clause' by employing
impermissible racial gerrymandering to create a new
majority-minority voting district.6 All four plaintiffs lived
in Lincoln Parish, a parish split between two districts.
Three of the four lived in District 4.7 Relying on Shaw v.
Reno,8 the district court found that the redistricting plan,
particularly District 4, was a product of racial gerrymandering and was "not narrowly tailored to further any
compelling governmental interest" thus, "the Plaintiffs'
right to equal protection as guaranteed by the United
States Constitution" was violated. 9
Louisiana and the United States, as defendant-intervenor, appealed to the Supreme Court. While the
appeal was pending, the Louisiana Legislature repealed
Act 42 and enacted Act I of the 1994 Second Extraordinary Session (Act 1"), a new districting plan.' 0 The
Supreme Court vacated the district court's judgment in
Hays Iand remanded the case "for further consideration
in light of Act 1."" Though the districts had been altered in shape, Districts 2 and 4 remained majority-mi-

nority.I Under Act 1, the new act, Lincoln Parish is entirely included in District S, a majority-majority district.
Therefore, none of the plaintiffs lived in the challenged
district.2 3 The district court found that Act I's District 4
was also racially gerrymandered and violated the Equal
4
Protection Clause.'
HOLDING
The United States Supreme Court, Justice
O'Connor writing the opinion for five justices with four
concurring in the judgment, held that the appellees
lacked standing to challenge the redistricting plan because they failed to show individualized harm. The Court
vacated the judgment of the remanded the case with
instructions to dismiss the complaint."5
ANALYSIS/APPLICATION
I.

REPRESENTATIONAL HARM FULFILLS
STANDING REQUIREMENT

Standing is perhaps the most important of the jurisdictional doctrines.16 The question of standing is not subject to waiver; the court cannot proceed if standing is
not established. 7 Shaw, the landmark case that recognized racial gerrymandering as a cause of action, did not
specifically address the issue of standing. The Shaw plaintiffs resided in the district in question;' therefore, individualized harm could be found. 19 The district court
found standing in Hays I and did not reconsider the issue in Hays 11. 20 Nevertheless, the Supreme Court must
address the issue even when it was not raised in the lower
court.

' A majority-minority district is a district"in which a majority of the population is a member of a specific minority

group." Voinovich v. Quilter,113 S.Ct. 1149, 1151 (1993).
2
Hays v. Louisiana(Hays ), 839E Supp.1188,1190 (W.D.
La. 1993).
3 United States v. Hays, 115 S.Ct. 2431, 2434 (1995).
4Id.
5Section 1 ofthe Fourteenth Amendment states:"No state
shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of the citizens of the United States; nor
shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law; nor deny any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." U.S. Const.
XIV sec. 1.
amend.
6

Hays, 115 S.Ct. at 2433.
Id. at 2434.
8113 S.Ct. 2816 (1993) (holding that Equal Protection
Clause claim can be stated by alleging reapportionment scheme
7

21

is "so irrational on its face that it can be understood only as an
effort to segregate voters into separate voting districts because
of their race.").
9Hays 1,839 F.Supp. at 1209.
01Hays, 115 S. Ct. at 2434.
" Louisianav. Hays, 114 S.Ct. 2731 (1994).
'?Hays, 115 S.Ct. at 2434.
13 Id.
14Hays v.Louisiana (HaysII), 862 F. Supp. 119, 129 (W.D.
La. 1994).
'-Hays, 115 S. Ct. at 2437.
6
Id. at 2435 (citing FW/PBS, Inc.v. Dallas,493 U.S. 215,
230-231 (1990)).
17 Id.

'Shaw, 113 S.Ct. at 2820.
'd. at 2828.
Hays,
115 S. Ct. at 2435.
21
Id. (citing FWPBS, 493 U.S. at 230-3 1).
20

The party seeking jurisdiction has the burden of establishing standing." In Hays,the Court utilized the "now
well settled" constitutional minimum of standing. First,
the plaintiff must have suffered an "injury in fact," an
invasion of a legally protected interest which is (a) concrete and particularized, and (b) actual or imminent,
not conjectural or hypothetical. Second, there must be
a nexus between the injury and the challenged conduct.
Finally, it must be likely that the injury is redressable.3
These requirements support the Court's continued refusal to "recognize a generalized grievance against allegedly illegal governmental conduct as sufficient for standing to invoke the federal judicial power."24 These considerations apply in the equal protection context as well.
For example, in Alien v. Wright, the Court held that the
injury "accords a basis for standing only to 'those persons who are personally denied equal treatment' by the
challenged discriminatory conduct." s On this basis, the
Court denied the appellees' argument that all citizens
of the state of Louisiana had standing to pursue a claim
for racial classification as established in Shaw.2 6
II. POTENTIAL SPECIFIC HARMS
Shaw presented examples of the harm an individual
residing within the racially gerrymandered district might
suffer. According to the Shaw Court, reapportionment
is nothing more than an effort to classify and separate
voters by race. It injures the voters in that it "reinforces
racial stereotypes and threatens to undermine our system of representative democracy by signaling to elected
officials that they represent a particular racial group
rather than their constituency as a whole."2 7 This type of
racial classification threatens to "stigmatize individuals
by reason of their membership in a racial group and to
incite racial hostility."28 The Hays Court noted that if
voting districts are based on racial classifications, individuals may suffer "representational harms." 9 "Elected
officials are more likely to believe that their primary
obligation is to represent only the members of that group,

rather than their constituency as a whole."30 In a Shaw
equal protection claim, any citizen able to demonstrate
either an individual harm or a representational harm has
31
standing to challenge the racial classification in court.
In Shaw, the Court recognized that demonstrating
the "individualized harm" required by the standing doctrine is not easy in the redistricting context. It is difficult to show why a particular citizen was placed in a
particular district. When drawing districts, legislatures
take many factors into consideration, including race.
Nevertheless, Shaw claims are based upon the principle
that "redistricting legislation that is so bizarre on its face
that it is 'unexplainable on grounds other than race' demands the same close strict scrutiny that we give other
state laws that classify citizens by race."32 Thus, the Court
stated, "[w]here a plaintiff resides in a racially gerrymandered district, ...the plaintiff has been denied equal
treatment because of the legislature's reliance on racial
criteria, and therefore has standing to challenge the
legislature's action.'0 3 If a plaintiff does not reside in the
racially gerrymandered district, the plaintiff does not
suffer the special harms delineated in Shaw.To establish
standing, the plaintiff must present specific evidence to
show he or she has been personally subjected to a racial
classification. Otherwise, the plaintiff would be "asserting only a generalized grievance against government
con34
duct of which he or she does not approve."
III. GENERALIZED HARM INSUFFICIENT FOR
STANDING
The Court searched for an individualized, specific
harm (the continuation of racial stigma or a representational harm) but found no evidence that plaintiffs had
been .injured. Nothing in the record showed that the
legislature was aware of the racial composition of Dis35
trict 5 (the district in which all the plaintiffs reside).
Even if the plaintiffs had established that the legislature
knew of the racial make-up of District 5, proof of "that
sort of racial consciousness" in the redistricting process
31
Hays, 115
32
Id.
33

S. Ct. at 2436.

Id. See McNutt v. GeneralMotorsAcceptance Corp., 298
U.S. 178, 189 (1936); Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 518
(1975).
23Lujan v. Defenders of the Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61

Id.Cf General Contractorsv. Jacksonville, 113 S. Ct.
2297 (1993). In General Contractors,members of a contract-

(1992).
24

ing association brought suit challenging a city ordinance which

25 468 U.S. at 755. (quoting Heckler v. Mathews, 465 U.S.
728, 740 (1984)). In Allen, parents of black children brought
a class action alleging that the IRS failed to deny tax-exempt
status for private schools which discriminate on basis of race.
The Court that found the plaintiffs did not have standing. Id.
at 755-56.
26Hays,
115 S.Ct. at 2435-36 (citing Transcript of Oral
Argument
at
36).
27

nesses in awarding city contracts. The city set aside certain

Hays,115 S. Ct. at 2434.

Shaw, 113 S. Ct. at 2828

28Id. at 2824.
29Hays, 115 S. Ct. at 2436.
"0 Shaw, 113 S. Ct. at 2827.

gave preferential treatment to certain minority owned busicontracts for the minority-owned businesses. Since no mem-

ber of the association could apply for the contract, the injury
component of standing was brought into question. The Court
found that the "'injury in fact' in an equal protection case of

this variety is the denial of equal treatment resulting from the
imposition of the barrier, not the ultimate inability to obtain
the benefit." Id. at 2303.
3Hays, 115

S.Ct. at 2436.
SId. at 2436.
36
Id.
3

is insufficient to establish injury in fact. 6 An individual
must be able to establish they were personally injured
by the racial classification.3 7 In this case, the appellees
could not establish an individualized harm.
The appellees argued that a generalized harm existed that allowed anjrone within the state to bring suit. 8
First, appellees argued that District 5 was a segregated
voting district and that their position was no different
39
than that of a student in a segregated school district.
The Supreme Court disagreed. Again, the Court said
that racial composition of a district is not enough to establish a violation of the Equal Protection Clause. The
legislature may rely upon historical boundaries to provide compact districts of contiguous territory (like District 2).10 Establishing a Shaw daim for District 4 says
nothing about the intent of the legislature for the composition of District 5.41
Appellees also insisted they were challenging Act 1
in its entirety and not just District 4 alone.42 The Court
gave this argument even less attention than the first.
Though all Louisiana voters are placed in a particular
district, only some are injured. Not every Louisiana voter
has standing to challenge the racial dassification of some.
A suit may be brought by "[o]nly those citizens able to
allege injury 'as a direct result of having been personally
denied equal treatment." 43 In Hays,the appellees failed
to meet that obligation.
The Court stated that appellees reliance on Powers
v. Ohio44 was incorrect. 45 Powersestablished that a juror
suffers harm as a result of racially discriminatory
preemptory strike and therefore could not be excluded
from a petit jury because of his or her race. Appdlees
argued they have a right not to be excluded from a district because of their race. In Powers, however, the juror
actually suffered a personal harm. The appellees in Hays
failed to establish that they suffered any harm or discriminatory treatment because they did not establish they
were placed in District 5, or excluded from District 4,
on the basis of their race.46 Because the Court found the
37

38

d.

Id. at 2435-36 (citing Transcript of Oral Argument at

jury.47 Furthermore, he believes that even if the plain-

tiffs had resided in the challenged district they would
not have suffered any4legally cognizable injury sufficient
to establish standing. 1
Justice Breyer, joined by Justice Souter, concurred
in the Court's opinion to the extent that it addressed
voters who do not reside within the district that they
challenge.49 Justice Breyer did not address the issue of
voters challenging a district in which they reside. Justice
Ginsburg concurred in the judgment of the Court withs°
out writing a separate opinion
CONCLUSION
In Shaw, the Supreme Court recognized a cause of
action for individuals residing in a racially gerrymandered
district and found that the injuries those individuals suffered were sufficient to establish standing. The question
left unanswered is how far the Shaw injuries reach. Hays
provides a preliminary answer to that question. In Hays,
the Court determined that no "specific harm" existed
for which an individual residing in the state, but outside
the district, may bring an equal protection claim. The
injuries required by Shaw are suffered only by those individuals who reside in the district. An individual who
is residing within the district has suffered an injury and
does have standing to bring the action."' It is important
to note that an individual not residing within the district may still establish standing by showing they have
suffered a specific harm. The appellees in Hays, however, failed to do so.
Summary and Analysis Prepared by:
Jason Eliot

4

SHays, 115 S. Ct. at 2437.

46

1d.

47

1Id. at 2439 (Stevens, J., concurring).

36). 39

Id. at 2436. (citing Brief for Appellees at 17).
Shaw, 113 S. Ct. at 2826.
4
' Hays, 115 S. Ct. at 2436-37.
42
40

1Id. at 2437.

43

appellees lacked standing, it did not reach the merits of
the case.
Justice Stevens in a concurring opinion stated that
plaintiffs who do not live in the district suffer no in-

Id. (quoting Al/en, 468 U.S. at 755).
U.S. 400 (1991).

44499

8

49

id. at 2440.

Id. at 2439 (Breyer, J., concurring).
-id. at 2437. (Ginsburg, J., concurring)
51 See Millerv. Johnson, 115 S. Ct. 2475, 2485 (1995). See
also this Digest, page 97.

